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Abstract This paper makes the novel observation that definite comparatives, such
as the bigger circle, impose restrictions on the cardinality of the comparison class
(CC) against which their truth conditions are evaluated. We show that the corpus fre-
quency counts of definite comparatives sharply drop when the comparison class used
for their interpretation is formed by more than two individuals. Two alternative the-
ories of these distributional facts are considered and tested experimentally through
an acceptability judgment task. According to the first theory, the 2-Individuals
Theory, definite comparatives presuppose that the CC is of cardinality 2; under
the second theory, the 2-Degrees Theory, the meaning of the comparative is eval-
uated against a granularity γ that maps the individuals in the CC to degrees in
the relevant adjectival scale, and definite comparatives presuppose that the set of
the degrees resulting from this mapping is of cardinality 2. Our results show that
definite comparative descriptions are most frequent and felicitous when evaluated
against comparison classes with two individuals, but also that acceptability drops
off with higher cardinalities in a gradient manner that is sensitive to granularity.
Taken together, these findings argue against the 2-Individuals theory of definite
comparatives and lend support to the 2-Degrees theory.
Keywords: definite comparatives, granularities, cardinality presupposition, degrees, indi-
viduals, comparison class
1 Introduction
Definite comparatives—in which a comparative adjective like bigger attributively
modifies a noun heading a definite description, as in (1a)—have similar meanings to
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Figure 1 Left: A comparison class of two different sized circles. Right: A
comparison class of five circles with different sizes. The gray box
highlights the intended referent of the definite descriptions the bigger/est
circle.
definite superlatives like (1b).
(1) a. the bigger square (definite comparative)
b. the biggest square (definite superlative)
Both examples in (1) pick out the largest square in some contextually given set of
squares, called the ‘comparison class’ (henceforth CC). With a comparison class
of size 2, the descriptions in (1) pick out the same referent. However, definite
comparative and superlative descriptions diverge in the expectations they carry about
the CC. In particular, they seem to impose different requirements on the cardinality
of the CC used for their interpretation. This is exemplified in Figure 1, which
represents two CCs of circles of different sizes that differ in their cardinality (2
vs. 5 circles). While definite superlatives seem to be equally acceptable in the two
scenarios, the acceptability of definite comparatives decreases when judged against
a CC of higher cardinality (see Figure 1, right scene). Though the literature on
comparatives and superlatives is vast, to our knowledge this is the first time that this
contrast between definite superlatives and comparatives is explicitly discussed in the
semantics literature (with the exception of Coppock 2019).
In Section 2, we provide corpus evidence that supports and helps us refine
this novel observation. We show that while comparatives are most frequent with
comparison classes of size 2, uses with CCs of higher cardinality are attested at a
non-negligible rate. This observation leads us to the question: What exactly is the
cardinality constraint for definite comparatives? Anecdotal evidence suggests that
when the CC contains more than two individuals, definite comparatives are typically
used in situations where there is one object that stands out with respect to the relevant
adjectival property, while the remaining individuals are more or less on a par. For
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Figure 2 Images accompanying the larger of the three birds (left) and the larger
of the three tombs (right)
instance, attested uses of the larger of (the) three are not always paired with images,
but Figure 2 shows two cases in which they are.1 Coppock (2019) observes that in
such cases, the smaller two objects of the relevant type (birds or tombs, respectively)
are of similar size, and the largest one stands out. This observation raises the
possibility that what matters is not the number of individuals in the comparison
class per se, but the number of degrees along the relevant dimension (e.g., size)
instantiated by members of the comparison class, at some level of granularity.
In light of this, we hypothesize that definite comparatives require that the CC
instantiate two degrees (the 2D Theory), rather than two individuals (the 2I Theory).
Section 3 introduces these two theories of definite comparatives, and discusses
their predictions with respect to the role of granularity in acceptability judgments.
In Section 4, we give results from an acceptability judgment task showing that
acceptability is modulated by granularity in accordance with the 2D Theory.
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Figure 3 Internet Archive Corpus results (the A-{er,est} of n). Left: raw
counts. Right: Proportion counts of adjective (e.g. bigger) to total
(bigger+biggest) in a cardinality.
2 Corpus Evidence: Asymmetries in CC Cardinalities
To support the intuition that definite comparatives disprefer comparison classes with
more than two individuals, we searched the Internet Archive Corpus2 for strings
of the form [the Adjective of numeral] (e.g. the bigg{er,est} of two), where
the adjective was either in the comparative or the superlative form. Adding the
prepositional phrase allowed us to target different CC cardinalities. Results are
reported in Figure 3. The left panel plots the raw counts for each of the cardinalities
included in our queries, i.e. 2-9, for a series of relative adjectives. The results
confirm our original observation that definite comparatives have a preference for
comparison classes of cardinality 2; this is shown by the stark dip in frequencies
for cardinalities higher than 2. The opposite pattern is observed for superlative
adjectives, with an increase from cardinality 2 to cardinality 3.
The results also show a tapering in the counts for the higher cardinalities in both
the comparative and the superlative. To compare superlative vs. comparative in a
way that holds constant the overall frequency associated with comparison classes of
various sizes, we transformed the raw counts into proportions of a total, where the
total for a given cardinality was the sum of the comparative and the superlative counts
within that cardinality. These results are presented in the right panel in Figure 3. As
seen in the plot, the decrease in raw counts observed for cardinalities over 2 in both
the superlative and the comparative does not hold across the board once the data is
visualized in the proportion space: Above 2, with the superlative, there is no decrease
in proportion as the CC size increases (in fact there is a slight rise in proportion),
but for comparatives, there is a decrease from 3-5 (13.58%) to 7-9 (5.15%). These
1 https://www.tripadvisor.com/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g297996-d3695414-i296727865-Three_
Tombs-Erzurum.html, accessed August 22, 2021; https://www.gutenberg.org/files/54024/54024-h/
54024-h.htm, accessed August 22, 2021.
2 https://archive.org/about/
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differences, however, can only be considered trends, as Welch’s t-tests did not reach
significance (comp.: t(3.99) =−2.03, p = 0.1; sup.: t(3.97) = 2.03, p = 0.1).
Overall, the corpus results suggest that the meanings of the comparative and
the superlative morphemes are sensitive to the cardinality of the CC used for their
interpretation. In particular, definite comparatives display a preference for CCs of
cardinality 2, while definite superlatives prefer cardinalities higher than 2. However,
uses of the comparative at higher cardinalities are attested at a non-trivial rate in the
corpus data, tapering off in a gradient fashion.
The corpus evidence we have reviewed in this section is only suggestive; given
only this, it remains open whether these attested uses correspond to actual semantic
and/or pragmatic constraints linked to definite comparatives, or whether we should
assume them to be negligible noise in our data. The next section articulates two
different answers to this question, corresponding to two possible theories of the
meaning of definite comparatives. We test these theories experimentally through the
study reported in §4.
3 The two theories
We now introduce two possible theories of the comparative morpheme -er as it
occurs in definite comparatives. The first theory, formalized in (2), treats -er as a
relation between a comparison class of individuals C, a gradable adjective A, and an
individual x, the target of comparison. Given these three parameters, the meaning in
(2) returns ‘True’ if and only if there is some individual x′ in the CC whose maximal
degree of A-ness is below x’s degree of A-ness. Putting it differently, the target of
comparison x must instantiate the adjectival property to a higher degree than the
standard of comparison x′, and the standard of comparison argument is existentially
quantified over.
(2) J-erK = λC〈e,t〉λA〈d,〈e,t〉〉λxe : x ∈C∧|C |= 2 . (Theory 2I)
∃x′ ∈C : max{d|A(d)(x)}> max{d|A(d)(x′)}
This meaning can be seen as a version of a ‘phrasal’ comparative operator à la
Heim (1985) or Kennedy (1997)—taking as arguments a gradable predicate, and
two individuals, the target and the standard—except that here, the standard argument
is existentially quantified over, and both the target and the standard are presumed to
be part of a given comparison class C. In the lexical entry above, the CC is treated
as an argument of the comparative, as with superlatives. This choice is mainly for
convenience of exposition, but empirical support for it comes from the fact that
definite comparatives license an of-phrase that can instantiate this argument (as in
the bigger of the two).
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Importantly, the meaning in (2) also encodes two presuppositions: the first one
states that the target of comparison x must also be a member of the comparison class
C. The second presupposition, highlighted in blue, imposes the requirement that
the cardinality of individuals in the CC be 2. Because this presupposition will play
an important role in our interpretation of the experimental results, we refer to this
theory as the 2-Individuals (2I) theory.
The second theory we consider here diverges from the 2I theory in that the
relevant cardinality presupposition is stated over degrees, not individuals. We refer
to this second theory as the 2-Degrees (2D) theory. We assume that the set of
degrees instantiated by a given comparison class depends on a contextually-given
granularity. We are inspired by Krifka’s granularity-based theory of imprecision
(Krifka 2007, 2009), and its developments and applications (Sassoon & Zevakhina
2012; Solt 2014, 2015; Solt, Cummins & Palmović 2017; Gyarmathy 2017), in which
scalar meanings map individuals to scales—in this case an adjectival scale—that
can be more or less coarse-grained, making more or fewer distinctions. We take
γA to be a set of degrees of A-ness or, equivalently, a granularity of the A-scale; a
subset of the A-scale. The degrees must be evenly spaced, such that for some size
δ , for any two members of γA, the additive distance between them is some integer
mutliple of δ . Two distinct granularities may have the same size; for example, if
the degrees of A are integers, then {...,5,10,15,...} and {...,6,11,16,...} would be two
distinct granularities of the A scale. A granularity is therefore characterized by both
a size and and offset from the zero element of the relevant scale.3
Let Aγ(x) ‘the measure of x along A with granularity γ’ denote the greatest
element d of γA such that A(d)(x):
Aγ(x) = max{d ∈ γA |A(d)(x)}
To restrict the granularity scale to a particular comparison class under consideration,
we define γA,C as the set of values that Aγ assigns to any member of C (the image of
Aγ under C).
γA,C = {d |∃x ∈C : Aγ(x) = d}
With this, the meaning of the comparative under the 2D Theory is given in (3).
(3) J-erKγ = λC〈e,t〉λA〈d,〈e,t〉〉λxe : x ∈C∧|γA,C |= 2 . (Theory 2D)
∃d′ ∈ γA,C : Aγ(x)> d′
As with the 2I theory, the meaning in (3) encodes two different presuppositions. The
first one is shared with the 2I theory and ensures that the target of comparison x is
in the comparison class C. The second presupposition, highlighted in red, imposes
3 For a characterization of the notion of zero element, see Elizabeth Coppock’s contribution to this
volume.
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Figure 4 Two granularities representing different levels of coarseness. The upper
granularity maps each of the individuals in the comparison class to dif-
ferent degrees, failing to satisfy the 2-degree cardinality presupposition
of the 2D theory. The granularity in the bottom maps the same compari-
son class to only 2 degrees thus satisfying the cardinality presupposition
of the 2D theory.
a cardinality requirement on the number of degrees represented in the comparison
class (γA,C). The latter presupposition will be satisfied as long as the individuals in
the CC, collectively, are mapped to exactly two distinct degrees.
To illustrate the role that granularities play in the presupposition satisfaction
conditions of modified NPs like bigger circle, consider the two granularities in Figure
4, which differ in their coarseness: for the fixed range shown, the top granularity
makes a 8-way distinction (i.e., it distinguishes between 8 degrees, yielding a 4-
way distinction among individuals in the comparison class), while the bottom one
makes a 2-way distinction (i.e., it distinguishes between 2 degrees, creating a 2-way
distinction among individuals in the comparison class). Now let us consider what sets
of degrees would be obtained if we were to map the comparison class represented
in the figure, composed of four circles of different size arranged horizontally from
smallest to biggest. Mapping the individuals in this comparison class onto the top
granularity scale results in four distinct degrees, represented by the different colored
boxes in the figure. Since the cardinality of the degree set is higher than two, the
presupposition of the comparative fails to be satisfied, and the description is as a
result undefined.
Matters are different when the bottom granularity in Figure 4 is considered. In
this case, the same comparison class is now mapped to only two distinct degrees,
as more than one individual is mapped to the same degree. Therefore, the 2-degree
presupposition is satisfied in this context, even though the comparison class consists
of more than two individuals. So far, so good, as far as the comparative is concerned.
However, under this granularity the uniqueness presupposition of the definite article
is violated, so the bigger circle as a whole is still not predicted to be felicitous under
7
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Figure 5 Left: Trial example representative of the experimental task. Right: Item
example representing the 12 conditions tested in the experiment. The
sizes were as follows. Gap/2: 10,30; Gap/3: 10,11,30; Gap/4: 10,11,30.
Prog 2: 25,30; Prog 3: 20,25,30; Prog 4: 15,20,25,30.
the 2D theory.4 In the experimental materials discussed in the next section, we will
see examples where the comparison class consists of more than two individuals,
the degree-cardinality presupposition is satisfied (due to a coarse granularity), and
the uniqueness presupposition of the definite article is satisfied as well. In these
contexts, the 2D Theory predicts a definite comparative to be felicitous, while the 2I
Theory does not.
In some cases, whether or not the 2D Theory predicts a description to be felicitous
relative to a given scene depends on the choice of granularity. It could happen that
given one choice of granularity, the presupposition is met, but given another, it fails.
In these cases, we predict that the degree of acceptability is related to the proportion
of granularities that fail, so our predictions about acceptability will be gradient. We
refer to a situation in which reference failure occurs at every granularity as global
reference failure.
4 Experiment
We now present a study whose goal is to adjudicate between the 2I Theory and
the 2D Theory. We used an acceptability judgement task where participants were
asked to rate, on a 1-7 scale, statements of the form This is the biggest circle, against
visual scenes displaying a comparison class of geometric shapes. The individuals
in the comparison class differed in size but were all of the same shape and color.
The intended referent was highlighted with a gray frame that disappeared if the
4 Note that the indefinite description a bigger circle, which does not presuppose uniqueness, is predicted
to refer successfully under the 2D Theory when the bottom granularity is chosen, as long as the
intended referent is either of the two circles in the green box.
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Adjective Noun
{big, small} {pentagon, triangle, circle, diamond, heart}
{tall, short} {cone, cylinder}
Table 1 Pairs of nouns and adjectives tested in the experiment.
participant hovered over it with the mouse. This was done in order to ensure that
participants could easily compare the dimensions of all the shapes displayed in the
scene. The size of the intended referent was kept constant across conditions (See
right panel of Figure 5).
Three factors were manipulated. The first was the CARDINALITY of the set of
individuals forming the comparison class. Three cardinalities (2 vs. 3 vs. 4) were
tested. Second, the RELATIVE SIZE of the individuals in the scene was manipulated.
This manipulation determined the degree of coarseness of the granularities licensed
by the context (see §4.4). In the progressive condition, the size differential was
kept constant across all the shapes in the comparison class, i.e., the size of the
shapes (in)creased by the same factor. In the gap condition, there was a bigger
size differential between the intended referent of the description and the second-
ranked object in the display, while the remaining objects differed in size by the
same factor. The six displays resulting from crossing the factors CARDINALITY and
RELATIVE SIZE were paired with two different types of descriptions differing only
in the ADJECTIVE TYPE, i.e., comparative vs. superlative, of the form ‘this is the
Adj-er/est N’ (e.g. this is the bigger/est circle). The resulting twelve conditions are
illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5.
4.1 Materials
Eighteen items were created. The adjective and noun pairs tested can be found in
Table 1. All geometric shapes were automatically generated in order to ensure that
the size manipulations were comparable across items. For instance, visual items
consisting of squares, circles or diamonds were generated by circumscribing the
shape in a circle whose size was controlled by scaling its radius. An example item
can be found in Figure 5.
12 filler trials were included. Filler trials were divided into acceptable (6 trials)
and unacceptable (6 trials) fillers. Most unacceptable fillers involved global reference
failure. For instance, in the first class of unacceptable fillers, the shape mentioned in
the description (e.g., This is the red/bigger circle) did not match the highlighted shape
in the visual display (e.g., a square); a second type of ungrammatical fillers failed to
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meet the uniqueness presupposition of the definite article in the description (e.g., the
scene contained two purple circles, one of which was highlighted, and the description
was This is the purple circle). The third class of unacceptable fillers involved cases
where the adjective in the description was unnecessary to unambiguously identify
the referent, thus incurring a violation of the quantity and manner Gricean maxims
(e.g., the scene consisted of a blue square and a green triangle and the description
was This is the green triangle).
For all grammatical filler trials, care was taken to construct the display in such a
way that the description referred successfully. Acceptable filler trials were of three
types: the first class involved descriptions that included a postnominal PP modifier,
instead of a prenominal adjective (e.g., This is the cylinder next to the cone); a second
class of grammatical fillers included negation in the description (e.g., the description
read this is not the biggest circle and the highlighted shape was the smallest circle
in the display); the last class of acceptable fillers included a color adjective in the
description (e.g., the description read This is the purple rectangle and the scene
consisted of all red rectangles with the exception of a purple rectangle, which was
also the highlighted shape).
4.2 Procedure
Participants were instructed to read the description that was paired with each display,
scan the visual scene and rate the acceptability of the statement as a description
of the highlighted shape. Participants provided their rating by clicking on one of
the seven points of the scale that appeared below the visual display. At that point,
participants were free to change their rating or proceed to the next trial by clicking
on the next button (See left panel of Figure 5). At the beginning of the experiment,
participants had three practice trials to help them become familiar with the task.
4.3 Participants
Participants were 196 native speakers of English (mean age of 35 years old) recruited
through the online platform Prolific. Data from 9 participants was discarded due to
failure to accurately rate the filler items. A participant was discarded if they had a
mean rating for the unacceptable fillers that was above 4 or a mean rating for the
acceptable fillers that was below 4. The results reported in §4.6 pertain to the 187
participants whose responses met these independently established criteria.
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Figure 6 Reference failure patterns for the gap and the progressive conditions
at cardinalities 3 (left) and 4 (right) as predicted by four representative
granularities (γ1-4). Each coloured box represents a different degree.
4.4 Linking Hypothesis
We assume that the acceptability of a definite description is modulated by its refer-
ence failure potential, i.e., the likelihood that a given description will fail to refer
in the context given the possible parametrizations of its meaning. In our experiment,
there were two ways in which a description could fail to refer. The first one involves
failure to satisfy the uniqueness presupposition of the definite article. The second one
involves failure to satisfy the cardinality presupposition of the comparative, which
can be either stated over individuals (2I theory) or over degrees (2D theory). The
2I theory predicts that the reference failure potential of a description is categorical:
provided that there is no uncertainty about the comparison class, the uniqueness and
the cardinality presuppositions are either violated or satisfied. On the other hand,
the 2D theory predicts that the reference failure potential of a description can be
gradient, since the same description can fail to refer given a scene depending on
how γ is parametrized. Figure 6 illustrates how the reference failure potential of a
description is modulated by the two experimental factors (i.e., RELATIVE SIZE and
CARDINALITY) manipulated in the current study.
We start with the left panel, which represents a comparison class of three different
sized circles in the gap (left) and progressive conditions (right) evaluated against
four different granularities (γ1-4). As seen in the figure, reference failure patterns
differ across the two levels of the RELATIVE SIZE factor. Within the gap condition,
the description the bigger circle is defined under the four granularities γ1-4. Despite
the fact that the comparison class contains three individuals, the cardinality of the
11
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Figure 7 Qualitative predictions made by the 2I (left) and the 2D theories (right).
set of degrees represented in the comparison class is 2, since the two smaller circles
are mapped to the same degree. Hence the presuppositional constraints imposed by
the comparative are satisfied. The important contrast to note here is between the gap
and the progressive condition. As shown in the figure, the reference failure potential
given granularities γbig1−4 is greater in the progressive condition, where two out of
the four granularities under consideration result in reference failure, compared to the
gap condition, where none of the four granularities are problematic. Therefore, we
expect the acceptability of the description to be higher in the gap condition compared
to the progressive condition.
Next we spell out how the cardinality of individuals in the comparison class can
affect the reference failure potential of a description. The right panel of Figure 6
illustrates a comparison class of 4 individuals in the gap condition (left) and the
progressive condition (right). Using the same granularities γbig1− 4 to evaluate
the meaning of the definite description, we see that the reference failure potential
is higher at cardinality 4 compared to 3 within the gap and the Progressive levels
respectively. In particular, focusing on the gap conditions, γbig1 causes the descrip-
tion to fail at cardinalality 4, while the description successfully refers at cardinality
3 when this granularity is adopted. Similarly, in the progressive conditions, the
description fails in two out of the four granularities when the comparison class
contains three individuals, whereas it fails in all the granularities but one when the
comparison class is formed by four circles. To summarize, in our experiment there
is higher reference failure potential in the progressive condition compared to the gap
condition, and for higher cardinalities compared to lower ones.
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Gap 2 Gap 3 Gap 4 Prog 2 Prog 3 Prog 4
Sizes 10,30 10,11,30 10,11,12,30 25,30 20,25,30 15,20,25,30
Total γ-sizes 20 20 20 5 10 15
Failing γ-sizes 0 1 2 0 5 10
Proportion failing 0% 5% 10% 0% 50% 66.67%
Table 2 Proportions of granularity sizes that give rise to a degree set cardinality
larger than two in each experimental condition.
4.5 Predictions
The qualitative predictions for the experiment are illustrated in Figure 7. We start
with the predictions for the comparative conditions made by each of the two theories
considered. The 2I theory claims that definite comparative descriptions should only
be defined when the cardinality of the comparison class is 2, and should fail to refer
otherwise. In the current experiment this should translate into high acceptability
ratings in the cardinality 2 condition compared to cardinalities 3 and 4 (left panel
Figure 7). The 2D theory (right panel Figure 7) predicts that the acceptability of
definite comparatives should be negatively impacted the higher the reference failure
potential of the description is in a given context. The reference failure potential
of the description is estimated as a proportion of the granularity sizes between the
smallest and largest differences between two objects in the scene that is guaranteed
to result in reference failure, regardless of the offset; see Table 2.
In the gap condition, the reference failure potential for cardinality 3 is less severe
than for cardinality 4: 5% vs. 10%. Hence a difference between cardinalities 3-4
is expected to be found within the gap condition, if a difference that small can be
detected. The corresponding drop in the progressive condition is much larger: 50%
vs. 66.67%. Hence we expect to observe an interaction between RELATIVE SIZE
and CARDINALITY, such that the acceptability of definite comparatives should be
lower at cardinality 4 compared to 3, with this drop being more accentuated in the
progressive compared to the gap condition.
We now turn to the predictions pertaining to the superlative conditions. We
are assuming a meaning for the superlative morpheme that does not encode any
cardinality presuppositions, so the reference failure potential for superlatives is null
in all the conditions tested. A consequence is that at cardinality 2, comparatives and
superlatives are at a par with respect to their reference failure potential. From this
perspective, we have no reason to expect a contrast between them or any penalty for
either at this cardinality.
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Figure 8 Experimental results. Left: mean acceptability judgements. Error bars
represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Dashed lines are mean
acceptability judgements corresponding to the grammatical fillers (upper
dashed line) which did not involve either local or global reference failure
and unacceptable fillers (lower dashed line), which always involved
global reference failure. Right: acceptability judgements z-scored by
subject. Error bars are 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Floating
dots represent mean ratings across participants for each of the items
tested.
Other factors might be expected to play a role in acceptability judgments above
and beyond reference failure potential, however. For instance, as a result of pragmatic
competition, the acceptability of the superlative might be boosted in conditions where
the acceptability of its comparative counterpart decreases. If utterance competition
plays a role in our results, both theories predict higher ratings for the superlative at
cardinalities 3 and 4, compared to cardinality 2 in both the gap and the progressive
conditions. Furthermore, if the acceptability of the superlative increases as the
acceptability of the comparative decreases, then the 2I theory predicts comparable
superlative ratings at cardinalties 3 and 4 (Cf. left panel Figure 7), whereas the 2D
theory predicts that the superlative ratings should also increase from cardinality 3 to
cardinality 4, as the comparative decreases in acceptability (Cf. right panel Figure
7).
14
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4.6 Results
Figure 8 contains the experimental results. The raw means for each of the conditions
tested were overall very high (> 5, see left panel of Figure 8), suggesting that all
conditions were perceived to be acceptable by our participants. Results were z-
scored by participant in order to normalize the ratings across subjects (right panel of
Figure 8). Data pertaining to the gap and progressive conditions respectively was
subsetted by cardinality (cardinalities 2-3 and cardinalities 3-4) and submitted to a
series of Bayesian Mixed Effect models, where z-scored ratings were predicted from
the factors ADJECTIVE TYPE and CARDINALITY and its interaction. All models
contained the maximal random intercept and slopes justified by the experimental
design. The brms R package was used to perform all the analyses. Simple effects
were computed using the function hypothesis also included in the package brms.
A significant ADJECTIVE TYPE × CARDINALITY interaction for cardinalities 2-3
within the gap condition was detected (β = 1.21, CI = [0.97,1.46]), such that there
was a significant increase in the acceptability of superlative descriptions in cardinality
3 compared to cardinality 2 (β = 0.25, CI = [0.09,0.43]), and a significant decrease
in acceptability in the comparative conditions going from cardinality 2 to 3 (β =
−0.98, CI = [−1.19,−0.78]). However, the equivalent 2-way interaction did not
reach significance at cardinalities 3-4 (β =−0.01, CI = [−0.28,0.25]).
In the progressive condition, there was a 2-way ADJECTIVE TYPE × CARDI-
NALITY interaction in cardinalities 2-3 (β = 1.22, CI = [0.96,1.47]). As in the
gap condition, the interaction detected at lower cardinalities was driven by both the
comparative and the superlative conditions, with superlatives increasing in accept-
ability in cardinality 3 compared to 2 (β = 0.25, CI = [0.09,0.43]), while ratings
were significantly lower for comparatives in the same comparison (β = −0.97,
CI = [−1.17,−0.74]). However, unlike what was observed in the gap condition,
a significant ADJECTIVE TYPE × CARDINALITY interaction was detected for the
higher cardinalities (β = 0.35, CI = [0.08,0.64]). This interaction was driven by
significantly lower ratings for the comparative in cardinality 4 compared to cardinal-
ity 3 (β =−0.29, CI = [−0.54,−0.06]). No effect was detected for the superlative
conditions (β = 0.06, CI = [−0.1,0.21]).
Finally, while there was a clear difference between the comparative and the su-
perlative conditions within cardinalities 3 and 4 respectively, such that the superlative
conditions were overall rated higher, no main effect of RELATIVE SIZE was found
for the comparative conditions at cardinalities 3-4 (β =−0.03, CI = [−0.22,0.15]).
Furthermore, no significant difference was detected within cardinality 2 for the com-
parative vs. superlative comparison in either the gap (β = 0.04, CI = [−0.11,0.20])
or the progressive (β =−0.13, CI = [−0.33,0.05]) conditions.
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Figure 9 Left: Trial example included in the production experiment. Right:
Proportions of definite comparative vs. definite superlative responses.
4.7 Discussion
We start with the implications of the current results for the two theories of definite
comparatives under consideration. Our results are overall supportive of the 2D
theory of definite comparatives. Parallel to what was observed in the corpus results
presented in §2, our experimental results show that definite comparative descriptions
decline in acceptability when judged against comparison classes of more than two
individuals; definite comparatives with cardinalities > 2 were judged to be less ac-
ceptable than ones with cardinality 2, and less acceptable than our fully grammatical
fillers (mean rating ≈ 6). However, the absolute mean ratings that comparatives
received at cardinalities 3 and 4 remain significantly higher (> 5) than the mean
ratings obtained for the unacceptable fillers (≈ 2), which were undefined due to
global presupposition failure. These findings suggest that participants did not judge
comparatives with comparison classes of higher cardinalities to involve global refer-
ence failure, contrary to what is predicted by the 2I theory. This pattern of results
can be easily accommodated by the 2D theory, which predicted a non-categorical
decline in acceptability ratings as the comparison class grew beyond size 2.
However, the crucial data point supporting the 2D theory is the significant
decrease in acceptability ratings found for comparatives within the progressive
condition at cardinality 3 compared to cardinality 4. This decline is to be expected
under the 2D theory due to the higher reference failure potential predicted in the
cardinality 4 condition, but cannot be explained by the 2I theory.
The 2D theory also predicted a 3-4 decrease in the gap condition, albeit a smaller
one, and no such decrease was detected. A possible reason for this is that the
acceptability judgment task used in the present experiment does not have enough
sensitivity to detect smaller rates of reference failure potential than those involved in
the progressive condition.
We now turn to the results pertaining to the superlative conditions. As predicted
16
Granularity in the semantics of comparison
under the view that comparatives and superlatives are competing expressions, our
participants rated superlative descriptions higher when the cardinality of the compar-
ison class was higher than 2, mirroring the decrease in acceptability for comparatives.
No other signs of pragmatic competition were observed in the experiment, probably
due to the fact that the difference in acceptability of the comparative descriptions
in the progressive conditions at cardinality 3-4 was not big enough to be reflected
in the acceptability patterns of the superlative conditions. Note that this pattern of
results could not be completely explained if we assumed that the meaning of the
superlative encodes a cardinality presupposition that requires the comparison class
to have a cardinality of degrees or individuals greater than 2. If this was the case,
the acceptability of the superlative descriptions should be on a par with ungram-
matical fillers. In fact, comparative and superlative descriptions received fairly high
comparable ratings at cardinality 2. In this respect, our experimental results differ
from the corpus findings, which did show a strong preference for the comparative at
cardinality 2 compared to the superlative (cf. Figure 3).
A strong preference for the comparative over the superlative at cardinality 2 was
also found in a pilot production study (n = 30) consisting of a forced choice task.
Participants saw the same visual displays tested in the comprehension experiment,
so the data was comparable to our comprehension data. Each scene was paired with
three possible descriptions (This is the tall-er/est cylinder or neither, see left panel
of Figure 9). Participants were instructed to choose the utterance that best described
the object highlighted by the gray box. Our findings paralleled the corpus results
such that at cardinality 2 participants overwhelmingly preferred the comparative
description, whereas at higher cardinalities there was a clear preference for the
superlative, although the comparative was on occasion chosen as well. So there is an
asymmetry between production and comprehension here: Production shows a clear
preference for the comparative in cardinality 2, but superlatives and comparatives
receive comparable acceptability ratings.
The production preferences indexed by the corpus and pilot results reported
here receive a straightforward explanation if we assume that speakers follow the
principle of MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION (Heim 1991), which states that given
two utterances with equivalent assertive content, speakers will prefer the utterance
with the richer presuppositional contribution. From this perspective, however, it is
surprising that comprehenders gave such high ratings for the superlative variant with
comparison classes of size 2. After all, it is well-known that violations of Maximize
Presupposition affect the acceptability of the utterance (e.g. #a sun is shining). One
way of squaring Maximize Presupposition with the high acceptability ratings for
superlatives in the cardinality-2 conditions may have to do with the strength of the
comparative as a competitor. Although the ratings for comparatives with cardinality
2 are high, they are not at ceiling; they are on par with the superlatives in the
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cardinality-2 condition, and significantly below superlatives at higher cardinalities,
which were very near the top of the scale. It may be that the comparative is a
somewhat weak competitor to the superlative, itself being slightly marked. We can
only speculate about why the comparative received less than perfect ratings in the
cardinality 2 conditions, but one possibility is that it competes with the positive
form (e.g. big), which is shorter. Further research will need to determine whether
Maximize Presupposition effects are modulated by the strength of competitors, and
whether the viability of the positive form plays a role here.
5 Conclusion
What matters for definite comparatives in English is not the size of the comparison
class, but the number of degrees it embodies. Definite comparatives require that
the comparison class embodies exactly two degrees on the relevant scale, relative
to a given granularity. Comprehenders flexibly search for a granularity that lets
the semantic requirements of the definite comparative be met. The more likely
this process is to result in failure given a scene, the less acceptable a definite
comparative is in relation to that scene. This paper adds to the growing evidence that
language comprehension involves reasoning under uncertainty about granularities,
and contributes comparison as a new domain in which this concept plays a role.
References
Coppock, Elizabeth. 2019. Definite comparative descriptions: the more superlative-
like comparative construction. Talk presented at SuSurrus, U. Mass Amherst.
Gyarmathy, Zsófia. 2017. A generalised framework for modelling granularity.
Journal of Semantics 34(3). 483–506. doi:10.1093/jos/ffx004.
Heim, Irene. 1985. Notes on comparatives and related matters. Ms., Semantics
Archive. University of Texas, Austin.
Heim, Irene. 1991. Artikel und Definitheit. In Arnim von Stechow & Dieter
Wunderlich (eds.), Semantik: Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen
Forschung, 487–535. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Kennedy, Christopher. 1997. Projecting the adjective: the syntax and semantics of
gradability and comparison: UC Santa Cruz PhD dissertation.
Krifka, Manfred. 2007. Approximate interpretations of number words: A case of
strategic communication. In Gerlof Bouma, Irene Krämer & Joost Zwarts (eds.),
Cognitive Foundations of Interpretation, 111–126. Amsterdam: Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät II.
Krifka, Manfred. 2009. Approximate interpretations of number words: a case of
18
Granularity in the semantics of comparison
strategic communication. In Erhard Hinrichs & John Nerbonne (eds.), Theory
and evidence in semantics, 109–132. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Sassoon, Galit & Natalia Zevakhina. 2012. Granularity shifting: Experimental
evidence from degree modifiers. In Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT),
vol. 22, 226–246.
Solt, Stephanie. 2014. An alternative theory of imprecision. In Semantics and
Linguistic Theory (SALT), vol. 24, 514–533.
Solt, Stephanie. 2015. Granularity and approximating number pairs. In Israel
Association for Theoretical Linguistics (IATL), vol. 31, 83–100.
Solt, Stephanie, Chris Cummins & Marijan Palmović. 2017. The prefer-
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